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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARK PUGHf
Applicant/Respondent ,

Industrial Commission
Case No. 85000966

vs.
BRUCE RING (Uninsured),

Supreme Court No. 860357

Defendant/Respondent ,
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or STATE
INSURANCE FUNDf
Defendants/Appellants,
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendant/Respondent.
STATEMENT J ^ ^
1.
ing

Did the Industrial Commission ert by incorrectly conclud-

that

a

statutory

employer/employee

relationship

existed

between Dennis Jacobsen and Bruce Ring?
2.

Did the Industrial Commission erip by incorrectly conclud-

ing that when a

statutory employer/employee

relationship exists,

the liability as between the common law employer and the statutory
employer is joint and severalf rather

than primary

and secondary

respectively?
3.

Did

the Default

the Industrial
Indemnity

Fund

Commission err by failing to involve
(Uninsured

Employers

Fund)

in the

scheme of liability as a surety for the uninsured employer - Bruce
Ring?

STATEMENT_QF_THE_CASE
Nature of the Case
A Petition
Dennis

for Writ

Jacobsen/State

of Review

Insurance

of the Industrial Commission

was filed

Fund

holding

for

by the defendants

review

them

liable

of

an Order

for workmen's

compensation benefits to Mark Pugh.

A hearing

was held

on March

Commission Administrative Law

19f 1986 before the Industrial

Judge

Richard

G. Sumsion

Pughfs application for workmen's compensation benefits.
was denied by Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance
that

Dennis

Jacobsen

was

not

a

Fund on

statutory

on Mark
Liability

the ground

employer

of Bruce

Ring (or any of Mr. Ring's employees) under the provisions of Utah
Code Annotatedf
1986 an

Section 35-1-42 (1953, as amended).

order was

Jacobsen was

entered by

a statutory

Judge Sumsion

On March 26,

holding that Dennis

employer, and was jointly and severally

liable along with Bruce Ring for the payment

of workmen's compen-

sation benefits to Mark Pugh.
A

Motion

for

Review

was

Insurance Fund on April 18, 1986.
Commission denied

filed

by

Dennis Jacobsen/State

On June 13, 1986 the Industrial

defendant's Motion

for Review

and the Admini-

strative Law Judge's Order was affirmed.
STATEMEIJT^QF^FACTS
Dennis Jacobsen
business

of

was

a

constructing

general

buildings,
2

contractor
most

of

engaged

in the

which were resi-

It was Jacobsenfs udual practice

dential. (R-89, 90.)
tract about

80% of

his work

to subcontractors.

Ring was a carpenter by trade.

(R-66.)

Ring

to subcon-

(R-90.)

Bruce

subcontracted to do

the carpentry work in the construction of a garage and addition to
a house in which Dennis Jacobsen was the general contractor (R-68,
69).

Applicant,

helper by Bruce
(R-46.)

Mark Pugh
Ring,

was employed

working

Pugh's wages

at

a

as a laborer/carpenters

rate

of

$5.50

were paid directly by Ring.

per hour.

(R-56.) While

engaged in this subcontracting job, Ring was free to work
for other

general contractors.

(R-76.)

Ring as to a time to commence work
provided

his

own

tools

and

Jacobsen did not direct

or stop

all

on jobs

the

work.

(R-91.)

tools for Pugh.

Jacobsen did no actual carpentry work himself.

(R-76.)

Ring
(R-75.)

Jacobsen

did not show Ring or Pugh how to accomplish any specific carpentry
task.

(R-98.)

employees.

Jacobsen had

(R-77.)

no

On October

right

to

2, 1985

hire

or

fire Ringfs

Bruce Ring and Mark Pugh

were putting up a beam while engaged in the subcontracting work on
the above

mentioned garage

job.

(R-49.)

Mr. Pugh was standing slipped out from
fall to

the ground.

Bruce Ring

under himf

surgery.

employer (R-150),

while

(R

49-51.)

Dennis

Insurance Fund.

3

causing him to

then fell on top of Pugh.

result of this accident, Mr. Pugh sustained
which required

The ladder upon which

injuries to

As a

his neck

Bruce Ring was an uninsured

Jacobsen

was

insured

by State

SUMMA£Y_OF_ARGOMENTS
The

Industrial

that a statutory
the general
Ring.

Commission

erred

employer/employee

relationship

amended)f there
order for a

statutory
must have

contracted to

Section 35-1-42

(1953 as

criteria/ bQ&h of which must be met/ in

are two

employer/employee
the right

for which he has contracted.

relationship

to exist.

to control execution of the work

Secondly/

the

work

which

he has

be performed must be a part or process in the trade

or business of such employer.
retain the

existed between

contractorf Dennis Jacobsenf and subcontractor/ Bruce

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated/

First/ one

by incorrectly concluding

Because

Dennis

Jacobsen

did not

requisite supervision and control over Bruce Ringf nor

was Ringfs work a part or process in Jacobsen1s business/ there is
no such

statutory relationship

between Jacobsen and Ring (or any

of Ring's employees).
Even if a statutory employer/employee relationship does exist
as between

Dennis Jacobsen

and Bruce Ring, the liability imposed

is not joint and several/ but
primary liability

rather primary

and secondaryf with

being thrust upon the more immediate common law

employer/ Bruce Ring.
Further/
involve the

the

Industrial

Default Indemnity

the scheme of liability.
as

a

surety

liable.

for

those

Commission

erred

Fund (Uninsured

The Uninsured
uninsured

by

is to act

who are primarily

Accordingly/ the Uninsured Employers Fund

steps into the

shoes of Bruce Ring and becomes liable prior to Dennis Jacobsen/

4

to

Employer Fund) in

Employers Fund

employers

failing

State

Insurance

Fund.

should be placed in a

Dennis

position

Jacobsen/State

of

secondary

Insurance Fund

liability

only if

nonpayment by Ring and the Uninsured Employers Fund occurs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT A STATUTORY EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN DENNIS JACOBSEN AND
BRUCE RING.
This Court has held that the question of
in service

to another is an employee or an independent contractor

is a jurisdictional issue
evidence to

which requires

Commission,

Commissions

562

P.2d

order.

227

Rll§£|l£I

(Utahf

1977);

QQBmQX-~X±-In&li§£lial--CmBi££iQnr
Where

the evidence

82

the

to weigh the

Lsdafi^Y^^Iudasilial

LuJssx^SflJifl-aDd-filflYfil

UTAH

188f

23

P.2d

225

is largely uncontradicted, as in the

case at bar, it is not so much a matter
in the

the Court

determine whether or not it preponderates in favor of

the Industrial

(1933).

whether one engaged

of weighing

the evidence

record as of determining whether the Commission arrived at

correct

conclusion

of

law.

EustlSX^-LsdaS—^JL-Illdusilisi

Commissions, supra.
In determining
for workmen's
Utah

Code

whether or

compensation purposes,

Annotated,

section sets forth the
independent

not one is an employee of another

Section

The

5

necessary to consult

35-1-42 (1953, as amended).

distinction

contractor.

it is

between

definitions

an
of

employee
these

This
and an

terms

are

mutually exclusive.

Section 35-1-42

provides in

pertinent partf

as follows:
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly
or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he
retains supervision or controlf and this work is a part
or process in the trade or business of the employer, the
contractorf all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractorsf are considered employees of the
original employer.
Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the performance of
work as an independent contractor is
considered an employer.
"Independent contractor" means any person, association,
or corporation engaged in the performance of any work
for another who, while so engaged, is independent of the
employer in all that pertains to the execution of the
work, is not subject to the rule or control of the
employer, is engaged only in the performance of a
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the
employer only in effecting a result in accordance with
the employerfs design.
Thus, the foregoing provision
which

must

ployer.
the work

be

satisfied

First, one must
for which

for

sets

one

have the

right to

he has contracted.

business" of

such employer.

set forth in the conjunctive, it
ment

be

met

before

one

a

two-prong test

to be deemed a statutory em-

has contracted to be performed must be a
trade or

forth

control execution of

Second, the work which he
"part or

process in the

Inasmuch as

is necessary

this test is

that each require-

can be considered a statutory employer

liable for the payment of workmanfs compensation benefits.
A. DENNIS JACOBSEN, AS GENERAL CONTRACTOR, DID NOT
RETAIN THE REQUISITE ACTUAL SUPERVISION OR RIGHT OF
CONTROL OVER THE WORK OF BRUCE RING SO AS TO INVOKE A
STATUTORY EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP.

6

The

case

of

Graham

Y--._R-i.-ThpI ne_ Found at ion , 675 P.2d 1196

(Utah 1984) strongly supports
Jacobsen did

appellants' contention

that Dennis

not retain the requisite supervision or control over

the work of Bruce Ring so as to

make Dennis

Jacobsen a statutory

employer of Bruce Ring and/or anyone employed by Mr. Ring,
The facts

of GxaljaiD

are as follows:

Graham was a carpenter

with 41 years of experience predominately in roofing.
retained by

a general

contractorf Thornef

Graham was

whereby Graham was to

shingle some of the roofs on homes Thorne was building and bill on
a monthly

basis for any work done.

social security or
employers.
schedule.
structed

withholding

Thorne made no deductions for

taxes

as

required

generally by

Graham used his own tools and established his own work
He worked on any

by

Thorne

or

house

someone

unrelated jobs.

Graham had

work

control

under

his

almost all phases of his
contractors.

At

one

construction at two of

he

t}o hire

supervision.

construction
timef

Thorne

Thornefs

whether

being con-

else who had employed Graham on

the right

and

chose

homes

work
told
in

others who would

Further, Thorne had
done

by independent

Graham
order

to
to

leave the
commence a

third and to dry the roof before shingling.

Graham contended that

he was entitled to

benefits

because

Thorne

fell from a roof

workmen's

compensation

from Thorne

was

his

"statutory employer" at the time Graham

he

was

shingling.

The

Industrial Commission

denied Graham any benefits and Graham appealed.
In affirming

the decision

Utah Supreme Court stated:

of the Industrial Commission, the

The applicant leans heavily on but one of two factors
required in §35-1-42(2). We are of the opinion that the
second factor, "supervision or control" by Thorne is not
supported sufficiently to establish compensability in
favor of Graham as an eligible "employee." . . . In
determining whether the statutory requirements are met
the courts have considered numerous factors relating to
the employer-employee relationship, and have pointed out
that none of them considered alone
is completely
controlling, but that they all should be considered
together in determining whether the requirements of the
statute are met.
Speaking in generality: An employee is one who is
hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to
perform the employers work as directed by the employer
and is subject to a comparatively high degree of control
in performing those duties. In contrast, an independent
contractor is one who is engaged to do some particular
project or piece of work, usually for a set total sum,
who may do the job in his own way, subject to only
minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only
for its satisfactory completion.
675 P.2d at 1198.
Many parallels can be
bar.

Just

drawn between

SlSbaiu and

the case at

as Graham was retained by a general contractor who had

almost all phases of his
contractors,

Bruce

construction

Ring

was

work

retained

done

by

by independent

Dennis

Jacobsen,

a

general contractor who usually subcontracted about 80% of his work
to sub-contractors. (R-90.)

The general contractor in Giahajn made

no deductions for social security
erally required by employees.

or

withholding

taxes

as gen-

Likewise, Mr. Jacobsen did not make

any deductions or withholdings from Mr. Rings

paychecks.

(R-92.)

Another similarity between SX3&3IB and the case at bar is that both
Graham and Bruce Ring provided
their respective jobs.
own work schedule.

If

(R-75.)
another

8

their

own

tools

for

working on

Further, each man established his
general

contractor

(other than

Mr. Jacobsen)

had

a

construction

Mr. Ring was free to go and
another

job.

(R-76

and

Mr. Jacobsen had no right

job

work for

in which he needed helpf

that general

R-91.)

Also,

just

to hire

or fijre

contractor on
in QLShSBr

as

Mr. Ring's employees.

(R-77.)
While none of the above mentioned factors considered alone is
I
completely controlling, when they are considered
entire relationship

is scrutinized,

Dennis Jacobsen did not retain
Bruce

Ring

employer."
Court is

which

is

the

necessary

it ^s

to

the case at bar.

supervision retained by Mr. Jacobsen
no greater

than that

readily apparent that

supervision

Each of the specific factors
analogous to

together and the

label

or
one

control over
a

"statutory

mentioned by

the Gj;.§i)am

The extent of control or

ovei Mr. Ring

was certainly

retained by Thorne over Grahamf as Mr. Ring

enjoyed great latitude in the performance of his work.
Furthermore, when the relationship between Jacobsen

and Ring

is looked at in terms of the "generalities" which the Qi^MlB Court
spoke of, the same conclusion must be reached.
paid a

fixed hourly

work; nor was Ring
control in

(R-83.)

or monthly rate to perform Dennis Jacobsenfs
subject

performing his

was engaged
Ring

to do

Bruce Ring was not

to

a

duties.

a particular

comparatively
Ratherf

piece of

high

degree of

Mr. Ring was one who
work for

a fixed sum.

was permitted to do the job in his own wayf subject

only to performance in a workmanlike manner.
Mr. Ring's testimony

in which

he stated

This is evidenced by

that Mr. Jacobsen never

gave him instructions on how to put up a wall,
9

or put

on a roof,

or anything
which
garage

of that type.

(R-85.)

Mr, Ring

received

from

first."

(R-85.)

In

followed plans
owners and

and

The most specific instruction

Mr. Jacobsen
performing

specifications

architects.

Any

his

which

of the

then

and

additional

(R-86

employee of

factors

"build the

dutiesf Mr. Ring

were

provided

owners and

by the

R-92.)

architects rather

In accordance with the

Ql3h&m Court's statement in which it spoke "in
these

to

changes or variances which needed to

be madef came at the behest
Mr. Jacobsen.

was

indicate

Dennis Jacobsen,

that

but rather

generality" supraf

Bruce

Ring was not an

that Ring

was an inde-

pendent contractor.
Another

Utah

case

which supports appellants1 contention is

H3iry_L^Youfl.g_£^
There the

538

Court stated

that the

P.2d 316

main facts

(Utah 1975).

to be considered in

determining whether or not a statutory employer/employee relationship

exist

are:

(1)

whatever

covenants

or

agreements exist

concerning the right of direction and

control over

whether express

right to hire and fire; (3)

or implied;

(2) the

the method of payment, ief whether in wages
to payment

for a

of the equipment.
skill required

or fees,

as compared

complete job or project; and (4) the furnishing
Other

factors

sometimes

considered

are the

in a particular occupation, the length of time for

which the person is retained, and
the parties

the employeef

the nature

believed they were creating.

C]}xi5££3B_^_l£dlJ5£li3l

Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948).

10

of the relationship

In considering

the additional

factors which

the AsiliSD and

Christen Courts deemed to be important as bearing on the issue of
control and supervision it

is evident

that the

the

a

that there was not enough

case

at

bar

compels

supervision or control so
Ring,

In

as

finding
to

make

Jacobsen

relationship in

an

employer of

looking at the covenants or agreements between Jacobsen

and Ring, it is apparent that Jacobsen had
over Ring,

little if

any control

When there exists no formal written agreements, as in

the case here, it is necessary to examine
discern what

the parties

conduct to

implied covenants may be in existence, as well as to

determine the nature of the relationship the parties believed they
were creating.

In examining

the record

it can

be clearly seen

that there was an implied understanding between Jacobsen
that Ring

was to enjoy much freedom in the execution of his work.

Jacobsenfs conduct exhibits the relinquishment of
supervision over

Ring.

Jacobsen

the site.

(R-93.)

his control and

would yisit the work-site about

three times a week, spending anywhere
day at

from 15

minutes to

three

times.

On

a full

During the six weeks in which Ring was

performing his duties, Jacobsen stayed at the worksite
only

and Ring

these

a full day

three occasions in which Jacobsen

spent an entire day at the work site, he worked on other phases of
the project
work.

such as

pouring concrete

or engaging in backfilling

(R-93.)

Further, the reason that Jacobsen hirbd Ring to
piece of

the work

is because

carpentry as Ring, and Jacobsen
11

Jacobsen was
wanted

t|o

perform this

not as proficient at
get

someone

who was

better

qualified

than

himself

to

perform

that task.

Thus, taking into consideration the limited

amount of

Jacobsen spent

as the

at the

work site,

hired Ring to do the carpentry

as well

work, the

(R-99.)

time which

reason why he

conclusion to

be drawn

is that Jacobsen intended not to retain any supervision or control
over Ring.

Rather, the

conduct

of

the

parties

indicates that

there was an implied agreement that Ring was to enjoy much freedom
in going about his business.
Another Utah
retain

the

case

requisite

which

indicates

control

5SffiBgivill£_^^
(1948).

or

that

Jacobsen

supervision
113

over

Utah 504,

did not
Ring

is

196 P.2d 718

In SfilMBeixillg, the Court stated:
It is now well settled in this jurisdiction
that the crucial factor in determining whether
an applicant for workmenfs compensation is an
employee or an independent
contractor is
whether or
not the person for whom the
services were performed had the right to
control the execution of the work. . . .
In this
case there is no evidence that
Mrs,. Cook had any right to control the work of
plaintiff and Gardner. The evidence clearly
shows that she did not attempt to control the
work in any particular, but on the contrary
she merely showed them what work she wanted
done and left it entirely up to them as to the
method or manner of accomplishing the desired
end result. . . .
The preponderance of the
evidence points to absence of right of control
on the part of Mrs. Cook. She was interested
only in the end result - that the repairs be
accomplished. She was not interested in the
manner
in
which
plaintiff
and Gardner
accomplished this end. 196 P.2d at 720.

The

situation

Sommeryille.

in

the

case

Just as Mrs. Cook did

12

at bar is analogous to that of
not

attempt

to

control the

work

of

the

plaintiffs

in

any

particular, but rather, merely

showed them what work she wanted donef suph is the case as between
Jacobsen

and

Ring.

As

previously mentioned, the most specific

instruction which was given
"Ifd

like

you

addition."

to

do

(R-85.)

to

the

Ring

garage

The manner

Jacobsenfs

at

first,

or method

and then work on the
of accomplishing this

desired end result was entirely up to Mr. Ring.
was interest

only

the

fashion.

the

end

result

project
(R-76.)

be

completed

in

a

of

the

repairs be

workmanlike

and

timely

entire

project

requested by the architect or the owner.

It is important

to note

that the

went directly to Ring to

changes

(R-92.)

This

in
is

in

^ome

to the complechanges

architect and

or;

job related

instances,

affect

the

that

That isf the only inpijit Jacobsen had regarding

Ring's work was as the subcontracting
tion

-

Just as Mrs. Cook

Mr. Jacobsenfs concern was with the end result -

accomplished, so
that

in

behest was,

owner sometimes

the

plan

certainly

bypassing
not

Jacobsen

altogether.

the t^pe of "control or super-

vision" the legislature had in mind when enacting §35-1-42.
In the early case of ABgel^Yjt^lBdasiXial^CQIBmissiorjf
105,

228

p. 509

(1924)f

whose

authority

reaffirmed in S3ll£3fi3_YjL-5£liDSl>3IB t 21 Utah
(1968), this

was

more

2d 139f

64 Utah
recently

442 P.2d 31

Court illustrated the difference between the control

which is exercised over an independent contractor as distinguished
from the control which an employer exercises over an employee.
Ansel,

the

contractor to

applicant,

one

Skoubye

I

contracted

with

a general

pour the foundation for an apartment building.
13

In

The

Industrial
Angel,

Commission

This

Court

ruled

that

Skoubye

was

an

employee of

reversed the Industrial Commission's rulingf

and stated:
In our opinion the applicant Skoubyef under
the facts of the instant case, was not under
the supervision and control of Angelf as
contemplated in the first part of the statute,
but his status was that of an independent
contractor, as
defined in the concluding
sentences of the statute.
Skoubye took the
work at a price of so much per cubic foot. He
saw the premises, knew the work
he was
required to dof and knewf approximately/ the
quantity thereof. He was to employ his own
help, fix their compensation and pay them out
of the five cents per cubic foot, or, in any
event. Angel was in no manner liable to
anyone, except to pay Skoubye five cents per
cubic foot for the work. Skoubye was master
of his own time. He could be present and do
nothing.
He could be present and help the
men, or he could go where he pleased, engage
in other business if he desired, and was only
responsible for the performance of the work in
a workmanlike manner. This he was compelled
to do in accordance with Angel's design, and
as to this Angel had the right of supervision. When Angel or his foreman saw that
the tamping was not being properly done, so as
to result in a finished workmanlike job, he
had the right to call attention to the fact,
and perhaps it was his duty to do so, in order
to avoid a plea of estoppel. What Angel and
his foreman did, it will be noted, went
directly to the point of effecting a proper
result in accordance with Angel's design. The
nature of the work was such that it should be
a finished job as the work progressed; that is
to say, every fact of the walls should be
finished and completed in a workmanlike manner
as the work progressed, and for that reason
proper tamping before the cement hardened was
vitally essential.
This, in connection with
showing the men where to commence, seems to be
the extent of the supervision exercised by
Angel and his foreman.
If Skoubye had seen
fit to convey the cement from the mixer to the
building in buckets or other receptacles,
instead of by wheelbarrows, as was done, it

14

would have been none of Angel's business, and
Angel would have had no right to interfere.
If one or more of the men had seen fit to
work only one or two hours a day, instead of
eight hours, which was supposed to constitute
a day, it would have been no concern of
Angel's. Nobody but Skoubye would have had
the right to complain.
We find in this case every element necessary
to constitute an independent contractor, and
not a single element necessary to constitute
an employee, of Angel.
An employee is a
servant of his master. His master employs him
and fixes the terms of his compensation. He
can direct and control all of his movements in
and about the work, and discharge him ad
libitum, unless there is some special agreement which limits his authority.
64 Utah at 111-112.
It is evident from this discussion that a
has the

general contractor

right, and perhaps the duty to insist that an independent

contractor perform his job in a workmanlike manner
ance with

the owner

or architect's design.

and in accord-

Further, he may also

require that a subcontractor perform his job within a certain time
frame where

time limitations

right of control is

are of

certainly

the essence.

distinguishable

However, this

from

that

of an

employer who may direct an employee specifically as to what method
or means to employ in accomplishing the end result.
The type of input
project

did

not

contemplated by
Jacobsen

rise

which
to

Jacobsen
the

the statute.

retained

amounted

level

to

no

the jobsite personally.

15

in

the construction

of supervision or control

The supervision
more

oversight which the architect and owner
they visited

had

than

and control which
the same type of

exercised over

Ring when

Jacobsen's right to control

and supervise was confined to making sure that the entire remodeling

job

was

performed

in

a

timely

and

workmanlike

Jacobsen retained absolutely no power to control or
method or

means by

Therefore, it must

manner.

supervise the

which the carpentry ends were to be attained.
be

concluded

aforementioned two-prong

that

test has

Jacobsen cannot be deemed

the

first

not been

a statutory

prong

of the

met, and accordingly

employer of

Bruce Ring or

anyone working under Ring.
B.

In

THE PORTION OF WORK WHICH BRUCE RING
PERFORMED WAS NOT A PART OR PROCESS IN
THE TRADE OR BUSINESS OF DENNIS JACOBSEN.

accordance

with

Utah

Code

Annotated,

(1953, as amended), for Dennis Jacobsen
employer of

Bruce Ring,

"part or process in

the work

that the

^j^Cheyrfii) Oil

Leg

1977).

Lee,

defendant

a

business of Dennis Jacobsen.

position is
In

plaintiffs

of Jacobsen.

part

process

a

565

P.2d

Company.

plaintiffs

Oaks

was

were

engaged

employed
on

an

storage tanks for defendant Chevron.
business of

producing, storing

trial court held that Chevron
16

At the time of

Oaks

Construction

hourly

basis

to clean the

Chevron

a

when a fuel

by

was engaged

and transporting
was

1128 (Utah

cause of action against

Chevron Oil Company for injuries sustained

accident

in the

A case which supports this

QQBS&ny,

brought

or

storage tank in which they were cleaning exploded.
the

It is

portion of work which Bruce Ring

undertook as a subcontractor was not
trade or

deemed a statutory

which Ring performed must be a

or business11

the trade

appellants1 contention

to be

Section 35-1-42

statutory

in the

crude oil.
employer

The

of the

plaintiffs

and

workmanfs compensation.
defendant

was

plaintifffs

therefore

a

The

statutory

sole

employer

provisions of Section 35-1-42.
ant had

issue

exclusive
on

of

appeal

was

was whether

plaintiffs

Plaintiffs conceded

within the
that defend-

retained supervision and control over their work so as to

fulfill the requirements
test.

However,

of

the

plaintiffs

first

contended

prong
that

of
the

establish that the work of cleaning the storage
a

remedy

"part

or

process

in

the

trade

the two-prong
facts

did not

tanks constituted

or business" of Chevron Oil

Company.
In discussing what constitutes
trade or

business"f this

a

"part

or

process

in the

Courtf citing with approval 1A Larson's

Workmen's Compensation Lawf Section 49.12f stated:
Thus the statute covers all situations in
which the subcontracted work is such a part of
the constructive employer's regular business
operation as he would ordinarily accomplish
with his own employees.
565 P.2d at 1131.
Accordingly/ for Bruce Ring's carpentry work to be considered
a part or process in the trade or business of Dennis Jacobsen, the
carpentry work undertaken by
ordinarily accomplished
case.

Ring

with his

must

work

own employees.

In October of 1985f at the time of the

Mr. Jacobsen had

five different

the

carpentry

work

was

And on

Such is not the

injury to Mr. Pugh,

each of

subcontracted

Mr. Jacobsen received three carpentry bids! on
17

which Jacobsen

construction jobs in progress in

which he was the general contractor.
jobs,

be

the

out.
job

those five
In

factf

in ques-

tion.

Mr. Ring

was the

successful law bidder. (R-90.)

annot be said that the carpentry
was

a

part

of

Jacobsenfs

work which
business

Ring was
which

Thusf it
engaged in

was

ordinarily

accomplished by Jacobsen's own employees.
Therefore, inasmuch as Jacobsen ordinarily contracted out the
carpentry portion

of his

construction jobs, this very work which

Ring was engaged in was not

a "part

or process

in the

trade or

business" of Jacobsen.
When the

evidence is

reviewed as

it relates to the factors

which by statute and judicial construction are dispositive of this
issue, it is apparent that the Industrial Commission erred when it
concluded that Dennis Jacobsen was a
Ring.

Because

there is

statutory employer

no statutory employer/employee relation-

ship between Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Ring, it
an

employee

of

Ring,

Jacobsen.

Therefore,

not liable

for the

of Bruce

cannot

be

deemed

Mr. Jacobsen/State

follows that Mr. Pugh,
to

be an employee of

Insurance

Fund

is

workmenfs compensation benefits due and owing

to Mr. Pugh.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT MR. JACOBSEN AS STATUTORY EMPLOYER, AND
MR. RING AS COMMON LAW EMPLOYER, WERE JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE TO AN EMPLOYEE FOR WORKERS COMPENSATION
BENEFITS DUE AS A RESULT OF THE EMPLOYEES INJURY.
The Industrial

Commission found

that Bruce

Ring and Dennis

Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund were jointly and severally liable to
Mark Pugh for the worker's compensation
of Pugh's

injury.

Appellants
18

benefits due

as a result

take exception to this finding and

contend that even if Dennis Jacobsen
employer, his

liability is

is found

not joint

immediate employer Bruce Ring,

but

to be

a statutory

and several along with the

rather,

Ring's

liability is

primary and Jacobsen's is secondary*
This issue

as to

joint and

several liability as opposed to

primary and secondary liability regarding statutory and common law
employers appears

to be an issue of first impression in the State

of Utah, and it is therefore helpful to consult outside authority.
Concerning the trend of statutory liability, Professor Larson
notes that the usual liability of a statutory employer is "secondary."

Larson, HfixJsmgn^s^CsinpgBSaiifiD

A case

49.11 a t 9-2.

which supports this point of view is EQ3SI§~HJL~H&DSfin, 211

Neb 132, 317 NW 2d 905 (1982).
who

iSSr Section

was

deemed

to

be

In Rogers, a shopping center owner

a statutory employer under Nebraska law,

engaged an independent contractor to move its business
equipment

from

Ralston,

Nebraska,

to

a new location in Omaha.

While in the course of employment, an employee
contractor
Nebraska

was

injured,

and

Rev. Stat. §48-116

subsequently
(1978)

and office

of the independent
sought compensation.

provides

that

a

statutory

employer and the immediate employer shall be jointly and severally
liable to pay

the

deciding

liability

the

compensation
of

the

provided

for

by

the

act.

In

respective parties, the Supreme

Court of Nebraska stated:
The joint and several liability imposed by §48-116 is
for the sole benefit of the injured workman. Between
the statutory employer and the actual employer, the
liability of the actual employer is primary and that of
the statutory employer is secondary.
19

317 NW.2d at 909
See also Duffy_Brothers_Construction^

207

Neb, 360, 299 NW.2d 170 (1980).
Another

case

from

same point of view is
1978).
for

Heref

in

SQUth

different jurisdiction expressing the
Y^WJJLJsiBSfiflr

576

Homes.

which

Built-Rite

L.V.S. Builders

was

a

date

1173 (Okla

was

sub-contractor

the

Built-Rites workmenfs compensation insurance
the

P.2d

Wilkinson was injured while employed as a carpenter

Built-Rite

project

a

of

Wilkinsonfs

sustained the award given
that Built-Rite

injury.
by the

on a

general contractor.
was not

in force on

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
State Industrial

Court holding

must be primarily liable for any compensation due

its direct employee
employer, incurred

-

Wilkinson,

and

that

secondary liability.

L.V.S. as statutory

The holding in this case

was in accordance with 85.0.S. 1971 §11 which implies

primary and

secondary liability by stating in pertinent part:
Where compensation is awarded against the principal
employer . . . such
award shall
not preclude the
principal employer form recovering the same . . . from
any independent contractor, intermediate contractor, or
subcontractor whose duty it was to provide security for
the payment of such compensation . . .
Missouri is another jurisdiction which has seen fit to impose
primary liability

upon the most immediate employer, and secondary

liability upon the more remote statutory employer.
In the case of

Arjdgisfiii y^Stsmrt>

391

S.W.2d

839 (Mo.-

1965) , Moeller Construction Company was the general contractor in
the construction of a

church.

Moeller

subcontracted the lathing

and plastering work on the church to John Steurer.
20

Another party,

George Stroup Lathing Company actually performed
on the

job for

Steurer.

plaintiffr Andersonf

Steurer

Company and was injured when a scaffold collapsed.

In determining

the liability of the parties involved, th£ Missouri

Supreme Court

Section

lather

287.040(4)

employed

The

Stroup Lathing

to

a

the plastering.
by

referred

was

then <J3id

the lathing work

Revised

Statutes

of Missouri,

which sets forth:
In all cases mentioned in the preceding subsections, the
immediate contractor or subcontractor shall be liable as
an employer of the employees of his subcontractors
. . . The liability of the immediate employer shall be
primary, and that of the others secondary in their
order, and any compensation paid by those secondarily
liable may be recovered from those primarily liable,
with attorneys fees and expenses of the suit . . . . No
such employer shall be liable as in this section
provided if the employee was insured by his immediate
or any intermediate employer.
In reference to this statute, the Court stated:
It is clear that the statute makes the immediate
(direct) employer of the injured! employee primarily liable for
compensation, and
makes the intermediate
subcontractor or subcontractors and finally the principal contractor secondarily liabl |e "in their order." In
other words, this liability is| on an ascending scale.
Applied to the instant case, the primary liability to
plaintiff was that of Stroup. Iif Stroup had not carried
insurance, the next one responsible for compensation
would have been Steurer, and finally Moeller.
391 S.W.2d at 845
Another case which had a similar resu{Lt as the above 3 cases,
but which did not rely upon
the r e s u l t ,

statutory interpretation

in reaching

i s j2i}A§SB~YjL_Mfil££D3SDr 147 k 705 (Conn. 1 9 2 9 ) .

claim made on behalf of Johnson was that, jalthough he
contractor

and

Mortenson

as

subcontractor

were

The

as general

both, without

i

distinction as

between

them,

21

liable

for

compensation

to Mor-

tenson's

employeef

the

obligation

marily that of Mortenson,
workman, and

In

to which

determining

contractor Johnson,

the

and the

employer of

the injured

of the general contractor was such as

reimbursement by

compensation payments
award.

the immediate

the situation

to entitle him to

to pay compensation was pri-

such immediate

employer, for

he was subjected by reason of the
liability

as

between

the general

subcontractor Mortensen, the Supreme

Court of Connecticut stated:
The answers to the questions reserved must be
sought,
not
through
construction of or
implication from our Workmen1s Compensation
Act, but by application of general principles
growing out of the relations, to each other,
of the
parties to
this action and the
situation resulting from the application of
section 5345, as between them, on the one
hand, and the claimants on the other.
Pascoal's
contract
of
employment
with
Mortenson gave him no right to recover wages
from Johnson, and the latter had no power of
direction over him. The presence of section
5345 in the act evinces, of itself, that no
relation exists between a contractor and the
employee of a subcontractor which, unaided by
the provisions of this section, would involve
any right to compensation from the contractor
as an employer of the claimant. The fact
that, for the limited purpose of attainment of
the object of that section, he is made subject
to a like liability as the actual employer of
the injured workman, does not alter their
status and relations, or abolish the logical
distinctions between them, when the object of
the statute has been served and rights are to
be determined which the statute does not
create or affect. . . .
As
between
Johnson
and
worcenson, the
liability of the latter should be regarded as
primary and that of the former as secondary
only.
147 A. at 708.
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Thus, in

light of the foregoing authority, it is appellants1

contention that the Utah Supreme Court
viewpoint and

should adopt

the majority

hold Bruce Ring, the claimant's immediate employer,

primarily liable and

impose

only

secondary

statutory employer, Dennis Jacobsen.
and equitable as the purpose

of

the

liability

upon the

Sucn a holding would be fair
Workmen's

Compensation Act

would be fulfilled.
The

purpose

of

irresponsible and uninsured
liability

on

the

35-1-42 ik to protect employees of

Section

subcontractors

presumably

by

responsible

fiBier_Constructipn_Cgmpan^

imposing ultimate

principal contractor.

678 P.2d

305 (Utah 1984)•

In the case at bar this purpose will be fulfilled if Bruce Ring is
held primarily liable and Dennis Jacobsen/state Insurance Fund are
held secondarily

liable.

sureties are unable

to

If

pay

Bruce Ring
the

and any

compensation

and all of his

due,

then Dennis

Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund will incur tjhe ultimate liability as
between

the

protected.

two

of

them.

Thus,

the

injured

employee

is

It is merely a matter of looking to those who are more

immediately responsible first.
POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY EXISTED BETWEEN
BRUCE RING AND DENNIS JACOBSEN/STATE INSURANCE FUND
WHILE FAILING TO INVOLVE THE UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND
(FORMERLY DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND).
It is appellants1 contention
erred

by

failing

to

impose
23

any

that the

Industrial Commission

liability

upon

the

Default

Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers
saw fit

to create

Fund) for the
benefits to

a Default

purpose

of

Fund)•

The

Utah Legislature

Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers

paying

and

assuring

employees of insolvent employers*

Code Annotated, Section 35-1-107

(1953f

as

the

payment of

Specifically, Utah
amended),

states in

part:
There is created an Uninsured Employers1 Fund
for the purpose of paying and assuring, to
persons entitled
to workers1 compensation
benefits when every employer of the claimant
who is found to be individually, jointly, or
severally liable becomes or is insolvent,
appoints or has appointed a receiver, or
otherwise does not have sufficient funds,
insurance, sureties, or other security to
cover workers1 compensation liabilities under
this chapter.
This fund succeeds to all
monies
previously
held
in
the Default
Indemnity Fund.
If it becomes necessary to
pay benefits, the fund is liable for all
obligations of the employer as set forth in
Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the exception
of penalties
on those obligations.
(See
§35-1-107 in its entirety attached hereto as
Appendix 1.)
Thus,

it

appellants1

is

statute, the Default
stands

in

statutory

the

position

Indemnity

shoes

employer,

of

Fund

Bruce

Dennis

that

in

(Uninsured

Ring

and

Jacobsen.

light of this
Employers Fund)

is liable before the

That

is,

the

Default

Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund) acts as a surety for any
defaulting employer.
Fund

(Uninsured

If the
Employers

liability of
Fund)

were

the Default Indemnity
bypassed,

and

all

responsibility were placed upon the statutory employer, this would
have

the

effect

of

placing

a

double

burden on a responsible

employer who obtains workers1 compensation insurance

24

coverage and

who thereby

contributes to

Indemnity Fund (Uninsured
U.C.A.

and

the funding I structure of the Default
Employers

31A-3-201(2)(a)(b)

hereto on how the

employers

Uninsured Employers1

in

pay

Fund.]

Funj3) .
Appendices

the

2

benefits

and 3 attached

provided

by the

i?e inequitable to require

It would

such a responsible employer first to
nity Fund

[See §35-1-68 (2) (a)

pay into

the Default Indem-

(Uninsured Employers Fund), and then be found liable as

a statutory employer and be forced to pay!a claim.
Although this issue has not been ruled on by the Utah Supreme
Court, other

handed 4 0 w n decisions in accord-

jurisdictions have

ance with appellants1 contention.
In

Davis„v.._Gopdin,

639

S.W. 2d

38 (Ky

App. 1982)f

the

custodian of the Uninsured Employers Fund appealed from a judgment
holding the fund liable due to
compensation claimants

the

co-employers.
of

co-employers

obtained

liable.

to

be

a

The

of

one

of workers1

Court of Appeals held

workersf| compensation

that a default in payment
had

default

against

all

award by

those primarily

Thusf the Court held that the fund's liability comes into

play after

execution is unsatisfied against those individuals who

have primary responsibility.
This holding of the
with

the

Kentucky

S.W. 2d 470 (Ky 1976)
Fund is

Kentucky Court

Supreme

of Appeals

Court case of XQeQB^x^Q&mshgll r 536

which stated

that the

Uninsured Employers

like a surety of the uninsured employer.

statedf "Like a surety it has no duty

25

is in accord

to pay

The YQSQSJ Court

at least

until the

principal, here
pay."

the employerf either fails to pay or is unable to

536 S.W. 2d at 471.

Another

jurisdiction

Employers Fund

is to

which

act as

held

that

the

Uninsured

a surety for a defaulting uninsured

employer is fiaxih S^QaSS&L,
(1974).

has

357

NYS

2d

46,

45

A.D. 2d 161

There the Court stated:
Subdivision 1 of Section 26(a) provides upon
the failure of an employer to pay an award,
"then and in such event . . . [unless review
or appeal is sought as set forth in the
statute] . . . the award shall be payable out
of the fund . . . "
Thus the Fund is a
creature of statute whose duty to pay an award
does not depend upon the making of an award,
but only upon the failure to pay an award
which has previously been properly rendered,
making it in effect a surety.

357 NYS 2d at 48.
Accordinglyf applying
to the case at
cases, it

bar, and

Utah Code

Annotatedf Section 35-1-107

taking into

consideration the foregoing

is apparent that the Uninsured Employers Fund is to act

as a surety for those defaulting employers who are found primarily
liable.

Thus,

Ring is the only

it

is

party

appellants' contention that because Bruce
primarily

liable

to

Mr. Pugh,

and the

Uninsured Employers Fund is to act as a surety for a lone defaulting party, the Uninsured Employers

Fund

steps

in

the

shoes of

Mr. Ring and incurs primary liability.
Then,

assuming

Jacobsen and the

State

that

Jacobsen

Insurance

is

Fund

a

statutory

should

be

employer,

placed

in a

position of secondary liability only if nonpayment by Ring and the
Uninsured Employers Fund occurs.

26

CONCLUSION
Appellants1 herein respectfully request that the Utah Supreme
Court provide the relief and find as a matter of law as follows:
1.
that

a

The

Order

statutory

of

the

Industrial

Commission

which

held

employer/employee relationship existed between

Dennis Jacobsen and Bruce Ring should be reversed so as to relieve
Dennis Jacobsen/State

Insurance Fund of any liability for compen-

sation benefits to Mark Pugh.

The

relationship

was

that

of a

general contractor to an independent contractor who was performing
a service that was not a part or process of the trade

or business

of Dennis Jacobsen.
2.
Jacobsen
Insurance

In

the

is

a

Funds

alternative,
statutory

if the Court believes that Dennis

employer,

liability

should

the

Dennis

Jacobsen/State

be secondary to that of Bruce

Ring, the actual employer.
3.

Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance F^ind is

compensation benefits

only if

Ring and

^he Uninsured Employer's

Fund are insolvent.
DATED this £L_ day of October, 1986.
BLACK & MOORE

James R. Black
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obligated to pay

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby
above

and

certify that

foregoing

Brief

four true
of

and correct

Appellantsf

postage paid or hand delivered, on the €

was

either mailed,

day of

October, 1986,

to the following:
Robert J. Shaugnessy
Attorney at Law
543 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Suzan Pixton
Administrator
Default Indemnity Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0580
Ralph Finlayson
Attorney at Law
236 Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114
Phillip B. Shell
Attorney at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT
84107

BY_
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copies of the

APPENDIX 1
§35-1-107

U.C.A.

ocr-x-Av/i. uninsured j&mpioyers' Fund -4 Creation — Liability — Funding — Administration — Subrogation — Insolvent employer «+-, Fund's rights
with wrongful act or neglect — Adjusting
claims — Duty to notify — Penalty — Assessment of self-insured employers, I—* •(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for the purpose of
paying and assuring, to persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits
when every employer of the claimant who is found to be individually,
jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent,'appoints or has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance,
sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities under
this chapter. This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is
liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2,
Title 35, with the exception of penalties on those obligations.
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided pursuant
to Subsections 35-1-68 (2) (a) and 31A-3-l!01 (2). The Jtate treasurer is the
custodian of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the commission shall
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration may be paid from
the fund. The commission shall employ counsel to represent the Uninsured
Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on
behalf of the fund, and upon the request of the commission, the attorney
general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in
which the employee resides or an employer resides or is doing business,
shall aid in the representation of the fund.
f
''\
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable
to or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the Uninsured
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and
benefits of the employee or their dependents against the employer failing to
make the compensation payments.
» •
T

(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The
court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section
a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in
the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority
as the liquidator's expenses.
'
i*
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee,* or
liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the
covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against
the fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the
assets of the insolvent employer.
(6) When any iiyury or death for which compensation is payable from the
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same
rights as allowed under § 35-1-62.
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division
of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management company, insurance company, or other company) that has expertise
and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. «(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon renr
dering a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this chapter,
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value
of the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct'that the
additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund/ Awards
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter. •

treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation Denents, expenses,
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to
the assets in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the
making of any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules, fot'the processing and
payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers'
Fund to pay benefits pursuant to the provisions of this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured employer, the Uninsured Employers'
Fund may assess all other self-insured employers amounts necessary to pay
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses
of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of
examinations under Subsection (12), and (d) other expenses authorized by
this section. The assessments of each self-insured employer shall be in the
proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the
preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium of all self-insured
employers for the preceding calendar year. Each self-insured employer
shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 days before it is due.
No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an amount greater
than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for the preceding
calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in any one year
an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the fund for one
or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid
as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are liable
under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the selfinsured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior
to July 1,1986.
'
••>
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the Industrial
Commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer
may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or
the public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing,
the Industrial Commission may order an examination of that self-insured
employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all selfinsured employers as provided in Subsection (11). The,results of the examiJ
fi
nation shall be kept confidential.
^
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1,1986, in Subsection (1)

substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for
"Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it appears; inserted "of the claimant who is found
to be individually, jointly, or severally liable"

before "becomes" and inserted "or is" after
"becomes" in the first sentence, inserted the
second sentence, added "with the exception of
penalties on those obligations" at the end of
the last sentence, and made minor word
changes; in Subsection (2) added "and
31A-3-201(2)M at the end of the first sentence,
substituted "commission" for "attorney general", substituted "employ counsel" for "appoint a member of his staff', added "and upon
the request of the commission, the attorney
general, city attorney, or county attorney of
the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title
is pending, or in which the employee resides

or an employer resides or is doing business,
shall aid in the representation of the fund,"
at the end of the fourth sentence, and made
stylistic changes; made stylistic changes in
Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in the first
sentence of Subsection (8) deleted "from the
Default Indemnity Fund" following "claim,"
substituted "benefits" for "compensation" following "for", inserted "uninsured" before
"employer" and "value of the" before "total",
deleted "made" following "award'1, inserted
"in connection with" following "in", and inserted "Uninsured Employers"' before
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12).
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APPENDIX 2

§35-1-68 ( 2 ) ( a ) U.C.AJ

(2) If injury causes death within the period of six yea^s from the date oi
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall $ay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in § 35-1-81, and further benefits in the
amounts and to the persons as follows:
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the
date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers'
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in tl^e Uninsured Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter
be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the Uninsured
Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time ^fter reaching the
initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the
Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may be
required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or
due the deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a
dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order
and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is ma^ie by the commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to
the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the
employer or insurance carrier before any further claii^i may be asserted
against the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is
filed within one year from the date of death, the coihmission's temporary order shall become permanent and final. If no temporary order
has been issued and no claim for dependency has beeki filed within one
year from the date of death, the commission may i^sue a permanent
order at any time requiring the carrier or employer t^ pay $30,000 into
the Second Injury Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of
death of the deceased.
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APPENDIX 3
S31A-3-201(2)(a)(b)

(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers' compensation insurance
in this state, including the Workers' Compensation fund of Utah under
Chapter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the state tax commission, on or before
March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3V4% and 3l/4% of the total
premiums received by it from workers' compensation insurance in this
state during the preceding calendar year. The percentage of premium
applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial
Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any percentage of premium over 3lU% shall reflect the reasonable reserves
necessary to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in
§ 35-1-107 in an actuarially sound financial condition. This taxable
premium shall be reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb), but not as provided in Subsection (l)(c). The
State Tax Commission shall remit from the tax collected under this
subsection an amount equal to 3% of the premium to the Second Injury
Fund created under Subsection 35-1-68(1), lUfo of the premium to the
General Fund, and any remaining applicable percentage of the premium to the Uninsured Employers' Fund created under § 35-1-107. No
tax that is to be transferred into the General Fund may be collected on
premiums received from Utah public agencies
(b) Effective July 1, 1987, the variable tax provided in Subsection
(2)(a) shall be replaced by a flat tax of 3V4%.
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THE IHDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000966

MARK PUGH,
Applicant,

/C'£-*~

vs.
BRUCE RING (Uninsured);
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND; and
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission, of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Harch 19,
1986, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G« Sumsion. Administrative Law Judsce.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Phillip
B. Shell, Attorney at Law.
The Defendant Bruce Ring was represented by Joseph C.
Foley, Attorney at Law.
The Defendants Dennis Jacobsen and/or State Insurance
Fund were represented by Dennis.V. Lloyd, Attorney at
Law.
The Defendant Default Indemnity Fund was represented
by Suzan Pixton, Administrator.

The principal issue in this case is whether the case is subject to
the provisions of Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. It is uncontroverted that the Applicant, Mark Pugh, was employed
as a laborer/carpentervs helper by Bruce Ring at $5.50 an hour. ' His average
weekly wage is controverted, and there are no payroll records'available that
would assist the Commission in a more precise determination of the Applicant's
weekly wage, but Mr. Ring certified that he paid the Applicant a total of
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ORDER
PAGE TWO

$1,353.50 over a ten-week period. Because the Applicant started at $5.00 an
hour and was earning $5.50 an hour at the time of his injury, it is reasonable
to assume that he was averaging about thirty hours a week. Consequently, the
Administrative Law Judge finds in the absence of more precise documentation
that the Applicant's average weekly wage at the time of his injury was $165.00
a week.
2. The Applicant's industrial accident is not controverted. He and
Mr. Ring were on ladders in the process of putting up a beam. He tried to
move the ladder a little bit to get in a better position, but the ladder
slipped, causing him to fall. Just as the Applicant was trying to get up
after his fall, Mr. Ring fell on him. The Applicant immediately experienced
numbness in his right arm and had pain in his neck.
3. The Applicant went to the Veterans Administration Hospital the
next morning, where his neck was x-rayed and he was informed that he needed
surgery. A cervical fusion was performed on October 7. The Applicant was off
work until January 1, 1986, when he obtained employment doing janitorial work.
A. The Applicant is currently working and has apparently had a good
result from his surgery. He indicates that his doctor believes it is still
too early to assign a permanent partial impairment rating*
5. The evidence is cl^ar^ that the Applicant was employed by
Bruce Ring, who was working as a subcontractor on a job for Dennis Jacobsen,
the general contractor. This was a residential construction job involving an
addition to a house located on the avenues. Mr. Ring had submitted a bid on
this job in accordance with the blueprints and specifications and was the
successful low bidder. He had hired the Applicant to assist him in the completion of this project. It appears rather clear from the testimony given at
the time of hearing that Mr. Ring had formerly been employed by Mr. Jacobsen
as an employee but in recent months had been working as a subcontractor on
various jobs obtained by Mr. Jacobsen.
6. It was Mr. Jacobsen1s practice to subcontract approximately
80 percent of the work involved in a given job that he took on as a general
contractor. Neither Mr. Ring nor Mr. Jacobsen are journeyman carpenters, but
both have worked a number of years learning the construction trade on an
on-the-job basis. There is no evidence that Mr. Jacobsen was any more
proficient as a carpenter than Mr. Ring. In fact, Mr. Jacobsen testified that
in his own opinion Mr« Ring if anything was more proficient than he was. It
is also clear from the record that Mr. Ring was working from blueprints and
specifications and that he had bid this job on a contract basis. It is clear
that no
employee-employer
relationship exists at this time between
Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Ring, and it is equally clear that an employee-employer
relationship did exist between Mr« Ring and the Applicant*| As an uninsured
employer, Mr. Ring is in no way freed from the responsibilities placed upon
him under the Workers' Compensation Act as an employer. He is personally
liable to the Applicant for the benefits provided under the Workers'
Compensation Act.
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Discussion
The primary issue presented to the Commission in this case is whether
or not the Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable with
Bruce Ring for the compensation due the Applicant under the provisions of
Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. This Section recognizes a responsibility on the part
of employers generally to provide protection to employees who may sustain
on-the-job injuries as a result of an industrial accident. The statute does
not change the legal relationship of employee-employer but does impose
statutory liability in certain cases where the
employer
him by a
control,
business

procures any work to be done wholly or in part for
contractor over whose work he retains supervision or
and such work is a part or process in the trade or
of the employer . . . .
(Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.)

I
In this case, there is no doubt that the subcontract work being done by
Mr. Ring was part or process in the trade or business of Mr. Jacobsen as the
general contractor. The statute extends coverage! to
all persons employed by him [the general contractor], and all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors . . . .
(Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.)
The basic philosophy of the statutory employer statutes enacted in most states
is
to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably
responsible principal contractor, who has it within his
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their
responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensation
protection for their workers.
(Se^ Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law. Section 49.11 at 9-12 [1982].)
In the recent case of Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby. 678
P.2d 305 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval a statement made
by the Arizona Supreme Court that
[this section] is a legislatively created scheme by which
conceded non-employees are deliberately brought within the
coverage of the [Workmen*s Compensation] Act.
In the Frisby case, the Court also quoted with approval the Arizona case of
Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 944 (1968). in
which it stated:
The evidence is clear in the instant case that the respondent
construction company exercised that degree of control over
:he job to be performed by the petitioner sufficient to bring
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petitioner within the meaning of Section 23-902, subsec. B.
They provided the material that he was to use; the job
superintendent together with the architect made inspections
of the job and there were consultations; but the final and
exclusive control of the job was vested in the job superintendent. The fact that petitioner was knowledgeable and
trusted in his field does not lessen the ultimate control
over the job by the job superintendent.
There is no evidence that Jacobsen provided any material used by Ring
in this job, but in all other respects the foregoing case is analogous to the
instant case. Ring testified that he considered himself to be totally subject
to the control of Jacobsen in the completion of this project. This was not
because he looked to Jacobsen for expertise on how to do the jobf but that the
ultimate job had to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner and the
architect and that there was almost daily input by Jacobsen in this regard and
in regard to the ultimate completion of the project.
7. In keeping with the perceived application of the Frisby case to
the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was
sufficient direction and control on the part of Jacobsen to render Ring and
his employees "statutory employees" under the provisions of Section 35-1-42.
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that this decision might well be
inconsistent with the Court's decj.sipn in the Graham case rendered just two
weeks prior to the Frisby decision; but because the Frisby decision is the
latter of the two, the Administrative Law Judge presumes that it reflects the
prevailing opinion of the Utah Supreme Court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Applicant is entitled to workers* compensation benefits from the
Defendant Bruce Ring in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. The
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable for the payment of
these benefits as a statutory employer under the provisions of Section
35-1-42. If the Defendant Ring is unable to comply with the provisions of
this Order within ten days from the date hereof, the Defendant Jacobsen and/or
the State Insurance Fund will be liable for payment of the same with a right
of subrogation against the Defendant Ring for reimbursement. Any determination of permanent partial impairment should be deferred until the Applicant's
condition has been certified and a permanent partial impairment rating
solicited from his treating physician or provided as a result of some other
independent evaluation.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay Applicant
compensation at the rate of $165.00 per week for thirteen weeks or a total of
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$2,145.00 as compensation for temporary total disability resulting from the
Applicant's industrial accident of October 2, 1&85, and interest at 8 percent
per annum in the sum of $73.92|
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay all medical
expenses incurred as the result of this accident, said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
Said expenses pertain solely to medical expenses and do not include charges
for nursing home facilities which the Applicant was provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay to Phillip B.
Shell the sum of $429.00 as an interim attorney's fee for services rendered in
this proceeding, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a determination of the Applicant's
permanent partial impairment, if any, be deferred until his condition has
stabilized and a rating has.been provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the e\ient the Defendant Bruce Ring
fails to comply with the provisions of this Ordfcr within ten days of the date
hereof, that all amounts payable by said Defendant shall be paid by the
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen and/or the State Insurance Fund with full rights of
subroga- tion against the Defendant Bruce Ring for reimbursement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (1$) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors ai>d objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
&&**
day of March, 1986.
ATTEST:

Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

//
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March
Jh
1986, a copy of the attached Order
in the case of Mark Pugh issued March
^//
1986, was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Suzan Pixton, Administrator
Default Indemnity Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Joseph C. Foley, Attorney at Law
543 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

*

Dennis Jacobsen
1688 Blaine Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at Law
Utah State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-1420
Mark Pugh
614 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Bruce Ring
P.O. box 913
Sandy, UT 84091
Phillip B. Shell, Attorney at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By
DeAnn Seely Ir
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DENNIS V. LLOYD, No. 1984
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420
Tel:

533-7840
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000966
MARK PUGHf

*
Applicant,

vs
BRUCE RING'(Uninsured);
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND; and
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Defendants.

*

COMES NOW, Dennis Jacobsen and/or State Insurance Fund,'defendants
in the above referenced matter, to file a Motion For Review of the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the Administrative Law
Judge, March 26, 1986. Leave was granted the defendants to submit their
Motion For Review 15 days after receipt of the transcript of hearing. Said
transcript was received on April 7, 1986.
Defendants seek a review of the Administrative Law uuaue s Order in
two regards:
1. Contrary to the preponderance of evidence, the Administrative
Law Judge incorrectly concluded that there was a statutory employer/employee
relationship between Bruce Ring and Dennis Jacobsen.
2. The Administrative Law Judge improperly ordered'joint and
several liability between Bruce Ring and Dennis Jacobsen and/or State
Insurance Fund while failing to involve the Default Indemnity Fund.
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POINT ONE

In his March 26, 1986 Order, the Administrative Law Jjjc|geicjejurjly• : : :
found that Mark Pugh was employed by Bruce Ring, a sub-contracttfr,#ofl#a* •• • •
residential construction job where Dennis Jacobsen was the general
contractor. The Administrative Law Judge then attempted to apply the facts
of this case to the provisions of Utah Code Anno., Sec. 35-1-42. In
pertinent part, Section 42 states:
Where any employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose
work he retains supervision or control, and such work
is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor, and all person employed by
him, and all sub-contractors under him, and all
persons employed by any such sub-contractors, shall
be deemed, within the meaning of this section,
employees of such original employer.
The test outlined in this statute has recently been applied by the
Utah Supreme Court in such cases as L. Jack Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation
and State Insurance Fund, 675 P.2d 1196 (1984), and Pinter Construction Co.
v. Clifford P. Frizby, 678 P.2d 305 (1984). The test is used as the
bellwether of a statutory employer/employee relationship giving rise to an
entitlement to workers compensation benefits under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
Concerning the first prong of this test, the Administrative Law
Judge found, in the case at hand:
Ring testified that he considered himself to be
totally subject to control of Jacobsen in the
completion of this project. This was not because
he looked to Jacobsen for expertise on how to do
the job, but that the ultimate job had to be
performed to the satisfaction of the owner and the
architect and that there was almost daily input by
Jacobsen in this regard and in regard to the
ultimate completion of the project.
Order, page 4.
Defendants believe that this finding relies inappropriately on Ring's
opinion of his relationship with Jacobsen and is clearly contrary to the
weight of objective evidence found in the record. At hearing, Ring admitted
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Motion For Review
Re: Mark Pugh
Page 3

• • •
• ••
t

• •• •

that Jacobsen, as the general contractor, was responsible for the timely #id #
workman-like completion of the entire remodeling project. (Trfnjc/jiijt; page; :
35) However, Jacobsen did not exercise direct supervision or joptrpt W$r • J I
Ring's carpentry work. Ring was free to work on jobs for othef tjerfefal* •• •
contractors. (Transcript, page 35) Jacobsen did not direct Ring as to a time
to start work or stop work. (Transcript, page 50)
Ring provided his own
tools and all the tools for Pugh. (Transcript, page 34) Jacobsen did no
actual carpentry work himself. (Transcript, page 35) Jacobsen did not show
Ring or Pugh how to accomplish any specific carpentry task. (Record, page
57) In fact, Jacobsen candidly indicated that Ring had far better carpentry
skills than Jacobsen. (Transcript, page 56) Ring admitted that, while he
would give deference to Jacobsen's opinion, Jacobsen had no right to hire or
fire Ring's employees. (Transcript, page 36)
As stated above, the only input Jacobseh had regarding Ring's work
was as that sub-contracting job related to the completion of the entire
project or, in some instances, changes requested by the architect or the
owner. It 1s important to note regarding the latter that the architect and
the owner sometimes went directly to Ring to affect changes in the plan
bypassing Jacobsen altogether. (Transcript, pag|5 51) In his testimony, Ring
described this relationship as follows:
Q.

Do you recall at any time Mr. jacobsen giving you
specific instructions on how to do any part of
that particular job?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What were you working on?

A.

You're looking for specifics, t guess?

Mr* Foley:
A.

Speak up. We can't hear you.

Well, suggestions were made da^ly — or when
Dennis would come around, and Whenever we would
meet. We would talk about progress to date and
futuristic construction on thai project.

The Court:

Now that was - - now I would assume that
would just be in the nature of "how's the
job coming" and "how ar^ things
progressing" and so forth. Is that what
you're referring to?
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visually.

'Cause he could see that
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Okay.

A.

So our discussions were instructural, and maybe
what was next — what phase was next, and what
was important for the contractor so he could get
other subs in behind me.

Q.

And did he make suggestions as to what was next?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you feel any obligation to follow his
suggestions?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he also give you specific instructions on how
to do a specific thing — without referring to
detail now — but was that the general
characteristic of his conversations, or they yery
general questions?

A.

T d say they were more general —
he has faith in me and - -

Q.

And he'd say things like "put up this wall" or
"lay down this deck," or something of that
nature, in a very general sense?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he ever give you instructions on how to put
up a wall, or how to put on a roof, or anything
of that type?

A.

No.

Q.

What's the most specific instruction that you can
recall him ever having given you?

A.

I guess near the start of the job. And that was
to build the garage first.
%

$ ©
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Q.

Q.

•

• • •
• • ••

knowing that

Is that all he said, was "build the garage
first."?
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"I'd like you to do the garage first and theji #
work on the addition."

Transcript, pages 42, 43, and 44.
The type of input Jacobsen had in this contruction project did not
rise to the level of supervision or control contemplated by the statute.
Jacobsen exercised only the type of oversight the architect and owner exerted
over Ring when they visited the jobsite personally. Jacobsen's efforts were
entirely directed at assuring the entire remodeling job was performed to the
satisfaction of the customer. Jacobsen had no hands-on supervision or control
of the carpentry work being done.
Considering the second prong of the test, the Administrative Law
Judge indicated:
In this case, there is no doubt that the sub-contract
work being done by Mr. Ring was part or process in
the trade or business of Mr. Jacobsen as the general
contractor.
Order, page 3.
This statement is inaccurate. As a general contractor, Jacobsen's only
responsibility was to choreograph the activities of the various
sub-contractors in assuring that the project is completed in a timely and
workman-like fashion. Jacobsen's business was project management, not
carpentry. At the time of this accident, Jacobsen clearly did no carpentry
work and retained the services of no employees who did such carpentry work.
According to his testimony, Jacobsen had five jobs going at the time of Pugh's
injury. (Transcript, page 49) The carpentry aspects of these jobs were bid.
According to Jacobsen, Ring was only one of three bidders for the job in
question. (Transcript, page 49) It was Jacobsen's practice to sub-contract
approximately 80% of the tasks involved in custom homebuilding. (Transcript,
page 49) Such jobs included the mechanical, electrical, carpentry, roofing,
sheetrock, and painting* (Transcript, page 54)
While Jacobsen had, in the past, employed carpenters or personally
undertaken carpentry work, he had done neither for four or five months before
Pugh's industrial accident. Jacobsen said he stopped doing business in this
manner as he was busy on several projects and was not as skillful a carpenter
as those who he could retain as subs. (Transcript, pages 49, 58)
Based on a review of the entire transcript, it is apparent that
carpentry work was not part or process in the trade or business of Jacobsen.
The fact that Jacobsen, himself, had done carpentry work over his 20 years in
construction and as an employer had employed carpenters directly some months
prior to Pugh's injury is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that as
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of the time of Pugh's accident, Jacobsen's trade or business did not involve
carpentry work or, for that matter, many other skilled trades pspe^s^cy itt the
building of custom homes.

• •
• •
•
•
•
• •
In applying the Graham and Frisby cases, the Administfa\ive Caw tfudge
a

noted that Frisby should be considered as controlling since that ruling
followed Graham by two weeks. Defendants take exception to this logic. It
should be noted that the Graham case was without dissent while Chief Justice
Hall and Justice Howell dissented in the Frisby case. Further, since the time
Frisby was decided, one of the majority Judges, Justice Oaks, has left the
bench. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge himself has relied on Graham in
ruling against an alleged statutory employer/employee relationship. The
Commission's specific attention is directed to Case No. 84001011, Jim Crosman
v. Rocky Mountain Coating and State Insurance Fund, decided by Judge Sums ion
on March 8, 1985. A copy of the Crosman case is attached for reference as
Exhibit A.
POINT TWO
In his order, the Administrative Law Judge found that Ring and
Jacobsen and/or the State Fund were jointly and severally liable to Pugh for
the workers compensation benefits due as result of Pugh's injury. No basis in
the statute or in case law is cited for the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that joint and several liability is appropriate.
Defendants believe a finding of joint and several liability is
inappropriate as joint and several liability connotes joint employment.
According to Professor Larson:
The normal consequence of joint employment is an
award calling for joint and several liability,
usually without apportionment. ... (Section 48.40,
page 8-110)

Joint employment occurs when a single employee,
under contract with two employers, and under the
simultaneous control of both, simultaneously
performed services for both employers, and when the
service for each employer is the same as, or is
closely related to, that for the other. In such
case, both employers are liable for workmen's
compensation. ... (Section 48.4, page 8-107)
Concerning the trend in statutory liability, Professor Larson notes that the
usual liability of a statutory employer is "secondary." (Section 49.1,
page 9-1)
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The Utah statute provides no direction as to whether pr. nQt.Jiability •
as between a common-law employer and a statutory employer wouljd SJsIj&ilitJ artdS j •
several, primary, or secondary. However, some hint is found ill Jthfi Stitiute is^ •
the legislature saw fit to create a Default Indemnity Fund for*tTie^purposV of*
paying and assuring the payment of benefits to employees of employers who
become insolvent* Specifically, Utah Code Anno., Section 35-1-107, states in
part:
(1) There is created a Default Indemnity Fund for the
purpose of paying and assuring, to persons entitled
to, workers compensation benefits when an employer
becomes insolvent, appoints or has appointed a
receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient
funds, insurance, sureties, other security to cover
workers compensation liabilities under this chapter*
If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the Fund
will be liable for all obligations of the employer as
set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. (Emphasis
added}
This provision must be read in concert with Utah Code Anno., Sec. 35-1-58,
which gives the employee a right to recover civil damages or workers
compensation benefits in an action against an uninsured employer. In this
case, the applicant, Pugh, chose to recover workers compensation benefits.
Pursuant to Section 58, Pugh's employer, Ring, must be held liable for the
benefits ordered paid under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. If Ring, for
reasons of insolvency, is unable to pay those benefits, the provisions of
Section 107 involving the Default Indemnity Fund should come into play.
In the case at hand, the Administrative Law Judge made no reference
to the liability of the Default Indemnity Fund to Pugh in the event that Ring
was unable to make payment of the workers compensation benefits ordered.
Arguably, the Default Indemnity Fund stands in the shoes of Ring and is liable
before any statutory employer.
This argument has not been ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court.
However, failure to so interpret the interrelationship of Utah Code Anno.,
Sec* 35-1-42, 58, and 107, would force a labored and illogical application of
the scheme of protection provided an employee. Bypassing the liability of the
Default Indemnity Fund and placing all responsibility on the statutory
employer effect a double burden on a responsible employer who obtains workers
compensation insurance coverage and who thereby contributes to the funding
structure of the Default Indemnity Fund. Why should such an employer first
pay into the Default Indemnity Fund and then be found liable as a statutory
employer and be forced to pay a claim? One must question under what
circumstances the Default Indemnity Fund would ever pay a claim for benefits
against an insolvent sub-contractor where there ,1s a general contractor. This
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also brings into question a potential conflict of interest between the
Industrial Commission and the Default Indemnity Fund. Organi^iogaJJy, #the •
Default Indemnity Fund is housed at and is operated as an armj3t#t&e: : : • ; I
Industrial Commission, but yet is a defendant in this very lavfcilit; I I I
. IJt
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed as to
the joint and several liability of Ring, Jacobsen, and the State Insurance
Fund. The Order should be re-written to make Ring primarily liable with the
Default Indemnity Fund standing in pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 107
should Ring become insolvent. Then, assuming that Jacobsen is still found as
a statutory employer, Jacobsen and the State Insurance Fund should be placed
in a position of secondary liability only if non-payment by Ring and the
Default Indemnity Fund occurs.
NOW, THEREFORE, defendants in the above referenced matter petition
the Industrial Commission to review and modify the Order as urged above.
DATED, this 1 8 * * d a y of April, 1986.

DENNIS V. LLOYD
Attorney for Defendants
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000966

*
*

MARK PUGH,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Applicant,

vs.
BRUCE RING
(UNINSURED)
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND and
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On March 26, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the
Applicant In the above captioned case temporary total compensation^ and medical
expenses. The Applicant suffered an on-the-job fall on October 2, 1983. At
the time of the fall, the Applicant was employed by the Defendant, Bruce Ringe
as a laborer/carpenter. The Applicant and Ring were performing work for the
Defendant/general contractor, Dennis Jacobsen, when the accident occurred. On
that date, Ring was not insured for workers* compensation and Jacobsen was
insured with the State Insurance Fund. The Administrative Law Judge found
that Ring and Jacobsen's insurer, the State Insurance Fund, were jointly and
severally liable for the benefits awarded the Applicant. On April 21, 1986,
the Defendant/State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review contesting the
joint and several liability, and arguing that Ring was the employer and should
be held liable for the workers* compensation benefits. The State Insurance
Fund states that if Ring was uninsured at the date of accident and is now
insolvent, that the Default Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits awardedc
The Commission is of the opinion that the Administrative Law Judge correctly
awarded benefits as against Ring and the State Insurance Fund, and that the
Default Indemnity Fund is not liable to pay benefits in this matter.
In* its Motion for Review, the State Insurance Fund argues that the
Administrative Law Judge incorrectly applied the "statutory employer" provision of U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts in this case* That provision reads as
follows:
••Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control., and such work is a part or process
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in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor,
and persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under
him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors,
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section,
employees of such original employer."
The Administrative Law Judge found that Jacobsen retained supervision
or control over the work performed by Ring, and that Ring's work was a part or
process of Jacobsen's trade or business. Therefore, per U. C. A. 35-1-42, the.
Administrative Law Judge found that the Applicant was both an employee of Ring
and also an employee of Jacobsen, causing Ring and Jacobsen to be jointly and
severally liable for the Applicant's benefits.
The State Insurance Fund argues that the facts show that Jacobsen did
not retain supervision or control over Ring, and that Ring's carpentry work
was not a part or process of Jacobsen's project management business. Regarding
the supervision and control, the State Insurance Fund cites particular pages of
the hearing transcript for testimony which indicates Ring acted independently
and without the supervison or control of Jacobsen. The State Insurance Fund
notes Ring provided his own tools (p. 34), hired his own labor (p. 36), and
that Jacobsen gave no instructions to Ring with respect to the performance of
the carpentry and did no carpentry himself (p. 35 and 57). Also noted was the
fact that Jacobsen did not direct Ring's starting or stopping time for work
(p. 50), and the fact that Ring was free to work other jobs (p. 35). The
State Insurance Fund concludes these facts show no control or supervision by
Jacobsen over Ring, and therefore, U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable and
Ring alone is responsible for the Applicant's benefits (as he alone was the
Applicant's employer). The State Insurance Fund also argues that Ring's carpentry is not a part or process of Jacobsen's project management business as
project management does not necessarily involve carpentry.
The Commission has reviewed the hearing transcript, and finds that
the testimony cited by the State Insurance Fund does support a finding of
limited control on the part of Jacobsen. However, other testimony seems to
point towards more than just limited control.
There is testimony that
Jacobsen had some voice in how many employees Ring needed, and some voice in
whether or not those employed by Ring were performing up to standard (p. 39
and 41). Jacobsen himself conceded, and Ring and the Applicant also testified
to the fact that Jacobsen was at the job site where Ring and the Applicant
worked, two to five times a week, and that Jacobsen supervised and directed
changes while there. Jacobsen also conceded he occasionally spent the entire
day at the job (p. 28, 29, 30, and 52). Also, even though Ring may have been
free to work for other contractors> he, in fact, did not. These factors indicate the higher degree of control associated with an employment relationship.
Similarly, there is evidence that carpentry was, in fact, more often than not
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a part and process of Jacobsen*s business. Jacobsen himself testified he did
not always contract out the carpentry and did some carpentry himself (p 55).
With the respect to the "part or process" issue, the Commission is
satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to show carpentry was a part or
process of Jacobsen*s business. There has been no real argument or evidence
to the contrary. With respect to the control issue, it is clear that there is
evidence pointing to very little control as well as evidence of a higher
degree of control. Because of this, the Commission feels it is appropriate to
look at the case law cited by both the Administrative Law Judge and the State^
Insurance Fund. L. Jack Graham v. R. Thome Foundation and State Insurance
Fund, 675 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1984) is a case where the Supreme Court found
insufficient control or supervision to apply U. C. A. 35-1-42, and hold the
general contractor to be an employer. The Court looked at some of the same
factors as have been pointed out by the State Insurance Fund in the instant
case, such as the ownership of the tools by the subcontractor, the fact that
the subcontractor was free to contract elsewhere, and the fact the subcontractor worked his own schedule. However, two factors noted by the Court in
Graham demonstrate that that case involved much less control and supervison
than does the instant case. In Graham, the subcontractor worked for several
other contractors while he worked for Thome, and during one month, actually
worked only three days for Thorne and worked the rest of the month for other
contractors. In the instant case, Ring worked for Jacobsen alone, full timee
Also, in the Graham case, the contractor knew very little about the work he
hired Graham to perform, therefore, he was not competent to supervise Graham*s
work except in a very general way., Once again, this is not true in the instant
case, where Jacobsen knew carpentry, and therefore, could and did supervise
the work performed.
In the other case cited by the Administrative Law Judge and the State
Insurance Fund, Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby. 678 P. 2d
305 (Utah 1984), the Court found a minimal amount of control to be sufficient
for purposes of applying the "statutory employer" provisions of U. Co A.
35-1-42. Concern for meeting the deadline, and the resultant directions to
the subcontractor to hurry, is the only factor of control noted by the Court.
The Commission finds much more evidence of control in the instant case, and in
viewing the Court's interpretation of sufficient control in Frisby, finds
Jacobsen had sufficient control over Ring so as to invoke the "statutory
employer" provision of U. C. A. 35-1-42. Furthermore, the Court's decision in
Graham demonstrates that less control than is indicated in.the instant case is
necessary before it can be found that U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable*
The Graham facts show not only no control by the Contractor, but also an inability to supervise because of unfamiliarity with the work the subcontractor
was performing. Those facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the
instant case., and so the Commission must conclude the instant case is an
appropriate case for application of the "statutory employer" provision of U.
•C. A. 35-1-42.
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With respect to the State Insurance Fund's argument that the Default
Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits due the Applicant should Ring be
insolvent, the Commission feels that the existence of the Default Indemnity
Fund does not preclude application of U. C. A. 35-1-42. The Commission finds
that if the legislature had wanted the Default Indemnity Fund to take the
place of "statutory" employers, the legislature would have repealed the
"statutory employer" section of U. C. A. 35-1-42, when the Default Indemnity
Fund legislation was passed. As the legislature did not do so, the Commission
finds the Default Indemnity Fund was not intended to replace statutory
employers. In conclusion, the Commission finds that there is no Default
Indemnity Fund liability in this matter, and that the Administrative Law Judge
correctly applied U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts of this case. Therefore, the
Defendants, Ring and the State Insurance Fund, are jointly and severally
liable for the benefits awarded to the Applicant in the Administrative Law
Judge's March 26, 1986 Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant/State Insurance Fund's
April 21, 1986 Motion for Review is denied, and the Administrative Law Judge's
March 26f 1986 Order is hereby affirmed.

^LAAI
Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

-

Lenic^L. Nielsen
Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/J*** day of June, 1986.

''Linda J. Strasbdrg
Commission/Secretary
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